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We describe the Medicaid eligibility rules for the elderly.  Medicaid is administered jointly by the
Federal and state governments, and each state has significant flexibility on the details of the implementation.
We document the features common to all states, but we also highlight the most salient state-level differences.
 
There are two main pathways to Medicaid eligibility for people over age 65: either having low assets
and income, or being impoverished due to large medical expenses. The first group of recipients (the
categorically needy) mostly includes life-long poor individuals, while the second group (the medically
needy) includes people who might have earned substantial amounts of money during their lifetime
but have become impoverished by large medical expenses. The categorically needy program thus only
affects the savings decision of people who have been poor throughout most of their lives. In contrast,
the medically needy program provides some insurance even to people who have higher income and
assets. Thus, this second pathway is to some extent going to affect the savings of the relatively higher
income and assets people.
Mariacristina De Nardi
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago






Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
230 South LaSalle Street

















Expenditures on medical care by Medicaid and Medicare, America’s two main public 
health insurance programs, are large and growing rapidly.  Although Medicare is the main 
provider of medical care for the elderly and disabled, it does not cover all medical costs.  In 
particular, it covers only a limited amount of long-term care expenses (e.g., nursing home 
expenses).  The principal public provider of long-term care is Medicaid, a means tested program 
for the impoverished.  Medicaid now assists 70 percent of nursing home residents,
2 and helps the 
elderly poor pay for other medical services as well.  In 2009, Medicaid spent over $75 billion on 
5.3 million elderly beneficiaries.
3 
An important feature of Medicaid is that it provides insurance against catastrophic medical 
expenses by providing a minimum floor of consumption for households.  Although Medicaid is 
available only to “poor” households, middle income households with high medical expenses 
usually qualify for assistance also.  Given the ongoing growth in medical expenditures Medicaid 
coverage in old age is thus becoming as much of a program for the middle-class as for the poor 
(Brown and Finkelstein (2008)). 
Another important feature of Medicaid is that it is asset and income tested; in contrast, 
almost all seniors qualify for Medicare.  This implies that Medicaid affects a household’s saving 
decisions not only by reducing the level and risk of its medical expenses, but also by 
encouraging them to consume their wealth and income more quickly in order to qualify for aid 
(Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1995). Although Medicaid covers poor people of all ages, this 
paper focuses on Medicaid’s rules on the elderly.     
Many recent proposals for reforming Medicaid could have significant effects on the 
financial burdens of the elderly, on the medical expense risk that they face, and on their saving 
decisions.  Moreover, Medicaid is a large and growing component of the Federal budget.  The 
share of total federal, state and local government expenditures absorbed by Medicaid has risen 
from less than 2 percent in 1970 to almost 7 percent in 2009,
4 and is expected to increase even 
                                                            
2 Figure taken from Kaiser Family Foundation (2010). 
3 Figures taken from the 2010 Medicaid Actuarial Report (Office of the Actuary, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services, 2010) for those who are “aged”.  Data from the Medicaid Statistical Information System shows that over .6 
million “disabled people are also aged 65 and older.  
4 Figures taken from the National Income and Product Accounts (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis), Tables 3.1 
and 3.12. 3 
 
more in the future.  Medicaid costs control is an important component in correcting the Federal 
government’s long-term fiscal imbalance. 
In this paper, we describe the Medicaid rules for the elderly and discuss their economic 
implications.  We focus on the rules for single (i.e., never married, divorced or widowed) 
individuals, to avoid the additional complications involved in considering couples.  The main 
difference between singles and couples is that the income and asset limits for eligibility are 
higher for couples.   
Medicaid is administered jointly by the Federal and state governments, but each state has 
significant flexibility on the details of the implementation, hence, there is large variation across 
states in income and asset eligibility and in coverage.  This variation may well provide elderly 
people in different states with different saving incentives, and it might even encourage them to 
move from one state to another.  We focus on finding the features common to all states, and 
identifying the most salient state-level differences. 
 
 
Overview of the Medicaid program 
Medicaid and Medicare were created by Social Security Amendments of 1965.  Although 
the program was initially intended to cover for the population on welfare (recipients of AFDC, 
SSI etc.), over time new legislation has expanded coverage to non-welfare recipients 
overwhelmed by their medical costs.  Table 1 provides a chronology of important Medicaid-
related legislation for the elderly.  Two key themes emerge from table 1.  First, Medicaid has 
increased the number of services provided over time.  Second, Medicaid has attempted to limit 












For our purposes, it is useful to divide elderly Medicaid recipients into three groups: (1) the 
categorically needy, whose low income and assets qualifies them for Medicaid.  This includes 
those who qualify for Supplemental Security Insurance (SSI) as well as “dual eligibles”, whose 
Medicare deductibles and co-pays are covered by Medicaid; (2) the institutionalized medically 
needy, who qualify for Medicaid because their financial resources do not cover their nursing 
home expenses; and (3) the non-institutionalized medically needy, who qualify for Medicaid 
because their financial resources cannot cover catastrophic non-institutional medical expenses.  



































Figure 1: Medicaid Enrollment and Expenditures by Maintenance Assistance Status in 2008, Age  65+ 













Figure 1 presents data on Medicaid enrollment and expenditures. In 2008 Medicaid spent 
roughly $75 billion
5 on 5.3 million beneficiaries ages 65 and older (data from the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services).  These data provide information on the number of people and 
expenditures in the different groups.  Of those ages 65 and older, SSI recipients accounted for 
40% of all beneficiaries and 27% of all Medicaid expenditures.  “Dual eligibles” represent 29% 
of all beneficiaries and 9% of all Medicaid expenditures, represent the second largest group of 
Medicaid beneficiaries.  “Medically Needy” individuals represent 10% of all beneficiaries and 
23% of all expenditure. “Others”, largely coincides with those with catastrophic medical 
expenses, but not technically “Medically Needy”, and represent 29% of all beneficiaries and 
41% of all expenses.  Although the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services technically refers 
to “Others” as categorically needy, a large share of this group are what we will refer to as 
medically needy because their circumstances (catastrophic medical expenses) are more like those 
of the strictly medically needy than those of the other categorically needy groups.   
 
                                                            
5 Data from MSIS cited in figure 1 show $68.3 billion, but these data do not include certain payments such as 
Medicare premia paid for dual eligibles.  For this reason the MSIS data likely understates dual eligibles’ share of 
total expenditures.  Also, the MSIS catagories are slightly different than those in figure 1.  However, virtually all 


















The categorically needy: SSI beneficiaries 
In most states, SSI recipients qualify for Medicaid as categorically needy recipients.  Under 
the Social Security Amendments establishing SSI in 1972, states were mandated to provide 
elderly SSI recipients with Medicaid benefits.  The law exempted states that in 1972 were using 
Medicaid eligibility criteria stricter than the newly enacted SSI criteria (Gruber, 2000.)  The 11 
states that had the more restrictive rules for Medicaid are referred to as 209(b) states (Gardner 
and Gilleskie, 2009).
6   
SSI pays monthly benefits to people with limited incomes and wealth who are disabled, 
blind, or are 65 years and older.  There is a (maximum) monthly SSI benefit that is paid for by 
the Federal Government.  States can supplement this benefit.  Figure 2 plots the federally-
provided monthly SSI benefit from 1975 to present.  Table 2 shows the state-level supplements 
for all states that have offered a supplement over the sample period.  In contrast to the federal 
benefit, which in real terms has been constant, the state supplements have varied greatly over 
time as well as across states.  
To qualify for SSI, individuals must pass both an income test and an asset test.  In non-
209(b) states, the income test is based on the combined Federal and state maximum monthly 
benefit.  Individuals with no income receive this maximum monthly benefit if they pass the asset 
test.  Otherwise, each individual’s “countable income” is deducted from the maximum to 
produce a net benefit.  In most states individuals receiving any benefit, no matter how small, are 
categorically eligible for Medicaid.  This implies that the implicit marginal tax rate for the 
threshold dollar of countable income – the incremental dollar that pushes the individual over the 
income threshold – is extremely high, because that last dollar of income eliminates the 






























































































Alaska  575  622  529  552  503  439  588 
California  409  482  363  407  217  249  233 
Colorado  109  146  118  90  78  45  25 
Connecticut   0  270  286  611    0  245  171 
District of Columbia  0  40  30  25  7  0  233 
Hawaii   69  40  10  8  7  6  370 
Idaho  255  196  158  122  51  63  27 
Illinois
1    NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Maine  41  26  20  17  14  12  233 
Massachusetts  450  363  261  215  175  156  233 8 
 
 
The conversion of actual income into countable income depends on whether the income is 
earned or unearned.  Earned income consists of financial or in-kind income from wages, self-
employment (net), and sheltered workshops.
7  Each dollar of earned income in excess of $65 
counts as 50 cents of countable income.  Unearned income includes Social Security benefits, 
worker or veteran compensation, annuities, rent, and interest from assets. Each dollar of 
unearned income counts as one dollar of countable income.  In addition, the first $20 of income, 
earned or unearned, is disregarded; the amount varies slightly across states.  By way of example, 
in 2010 the maximum Federal benefit for single, aged SSI recipients is $674.  To qualify for SSI, 
an individual must have less than $6742 + $65 + $20 = $1,433 of earned income, or $674 + $20 
                                                            
7 Sheltered workshops are organizations that provide employment to people with disabilities (Sheltered Workshops. 
Inc, 2011). 
Michigan  49  64  55  50  19  17  233 
Minnesota   126  90  71  125  113  98  233 
Nebraska  271  199  140  63  17  10  233 
Nevada  223  124  73  60  50  44  37 
New Hampshire   49  122  55  45  38  33  41 
New Jersey  97  61  63  52  43  38  233 
New York  247  167  124  144  120  105  95 
Oklahoma   109  209  122  107  75  64  45 
Oregon  69  32  4  3  3  2  2 
Pennsylvania  81  85  65  53  38  33  233 
Rhode Island  126  111  109  107  89  78  233 
South Dakota  0  40  30  25  21  18  15 
Utah  0  26  20  10  0  0  233 
Vermont  117  109  107  105  65  72  246 
Washington  146  114  77  47  35  32  47 
Wisconsin  284  265  203  172  117  102  85 






= $694 in unearned income.  Finally, several types of income, most notably Food Stamps, are 
excluded from the income test.
8 
The income standards used by the 209(b) states do not have to follow this formula, although 
some do.  The law only requires that the states impose criteria no stricter than those in effect in 
1972 (Green Book, 2004). 
   The asset test is more straightforward.  Individuals with assets at or below the state-specific 
threshold qualify.  Individuals with assets above the threshold do not qualify.  This implies that 
the implicit marginal tax rate for the threshold dollar of assets is extremely high, as that last 
dollar of assets eliminates the individual’s SSI and Medicaid benefits.  Such a penalty provides a 
strong disincentive to saving, and encourages people to spend down their assets until they fall 
below the threshold. The asset threshold varies across states, with a modal value of $2,000.  It is 
also the case, however, that many important categories of wealth are exempt, including one’s 
principal residence.  Table 3 lists assets that are excluded for elderly individuals: 
                                                            
8 In addition to Food Stamps, the exempt categories include income that is set aside towards an approved plan for 
achieving self support (used by the blind and disabled to pay off educational or vocational goals), and certain types 























Table 4 shows the current income and asset thresholds for each state.  The 209(b) states 
appear at the bottom of the table.  The only common factor across 209(b) states is that 
individuals have to apply for Medicaid separately from their SSI Benefit application.  Although 
some of the 209(b) states impose tighter income or asset restrictions  for Medicaid, SSI eligibility 
















Alabama  2,000  674  20  1,433 
Alaska  2,000  1262  20  2,609 
Arizona  No Limit  903  20  1,891 
Arkansas  2,000  674  20  1,433 
California  2,000  907  230  2,109 
Colorado  2,000  699  20  1,483 
Delaware  2,000  674  20  1,433 
District of 
Columbia  4,000  907  20  1,899 
Florida  5,000  674  20  1,433 
Georgia  2,000  674  20  1,433 
Idaho  2,000  701  20  1,487 
Iowa  2,000  674  20  1,433 
Kansas  2,000  674  20  1,433 
Kentucky  2,000  674  20  1,433 
Louisiana  2,000  674  20  1,433 
Maine  2,000  907  75  1,954 
Maryland  2,500  674  20  1,433 
Massachusetts  2,000  907  20  1,899 
Michigan  2,000  907  20  1,899 
Mississippi  4,000  724  50  1,563 
Montana  2,000  674  20  1,433 
Nebraska  4,000  907  20  1,899 
Nevada  2,000  711  20  1,507 11 
 
New Jersey  4,000  907  20  1,899 
New Mexico  2,000  674  20  1,433 
New York  4,350  769  20  1,623 
North Carolina  2,000  903  20  1,891 
Oregon  4,000  676  20  1,437 
Pennsylvania  2,000  907  20  1,899 
Rhode Island  4,000  907  20  1,899 
South Carolina  4,000  903  20  1,891 
South Dakota  2,000  689  20  1,463 
Tennessee  2,000  674  20  1,433 
Texas  2,000  674  20  1,433 
Utah  2,000  907  20  1,899 
Vermont  2,000  920  20  1925 
Washington  2,000  721  20  1,527 
West Virginia  2,000  674  20  1,433 
Wisconsin  2,000  759  20  1,603 




1600  845  278  2033 
Hawaii
4  2,000  1,044  20  2,173 
Illinois  2,000  674  25  1438 
Indiana 
SSI: 2000, Medicaid: 
1500  674  20  1433 




1000  768  20  1621 
New Hampshire4 
SSI: 2000, Medicaid: 
1500  715  13  1508 
North Dakota  3,000  674  20  1,433 
Ohio 
SSI: 2000, Medicaid: 
1500  674  20  1,433 
Oklahoma  2,000  719  20  1,523 







The categorically needy: dual eligibles 
 
“Dual eligibles” are individuals who are enrolled in Medicaid and have Medicaid pay 
Medicare premia.  Medicare covers basic health services, including physicians and hospital care, 
for the elderly.  Medicare Part B, which covers outpatient services such as doctor visits, costs 
$96.40 per month.  As a dual eligible, an aged individual can get Medicaid to cover Medicare 
premiums and services that Medicare does not cover.  Depending on their income, dual eligibles 
can qualify as Qualified Medicare Beneficiaries (QMB’s), Specified Low Income Beneficiaries 
(SLMB’s) or Qualified Individuals (QI’s).   QMB’s are assisted with Medicare Part B premiums 
and co-payments.  In most states the QMB income limit is 100% of the Federal Poverty Level 
($903 for single elderly people), and the asset limit is $6,600.  However, 9 states (including New 
York) do not impose any asset limits, and a subset of these states also provide more generous 
income limit and disregard amounts.  SLMB’s are elderly individuals with income between 
100% and 120% of the Federal Poverty Level.  SLMB’s are assisted with premiums only.  QI’s 
are individuals with income between 120% and 135% of the poverty level who, depending on 
funding availability, may receive assistance with Medicare Part  B premiums.  (The Kaiser 
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2010a and 2010b.)  Table 5 shows the asset and 






















Alabama  903   1,083   1,219  20   No Limit 
Alaska  1,108   1,333   1,503  20   6,600  
Arizona  903   1,083   1,219  20   No Limit 
Arkansas  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
California  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Colorado  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  


























Florida  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Georgia  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Idaho  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Iowa  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Kansas  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Kentucky  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Louisiana  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Maine  1,354   1,535   1,670  75   No Limit 
Maryland  902   1,083   1,218  20   6,600  
Massachusetts  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Michigan  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Mississippi  903   1,083   1,219  50   No Limit 
Montana  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Nebraska  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Nevada  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
New Jersey  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
New Mexico  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
New York  903   1,083   1,219  20   No Limit 
North Carolina  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Oregon  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Pennsylvania  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Rhode Island  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
South Carolina  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
South Dakota  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Tennessee  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Texas  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Utah  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  





















Washington  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
West Virginia  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Wisconsin  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Wyoming  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
209(b) States 





Hawaii  1,039   1,246   1,402  20   6,600  
Illinois  903   1,083   1,219  25   6,600  
Indiana  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Minnesota  903   1,083   1,219  20   10,000  
Missouri  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
New Hampshire  903   1,083   1,219  13   6,600  
North Dakota  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Ohio  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  
Oklahoma  903   1,083   1,219  20   6,600  





The medically needy 
 
Individuals with income or assets above the categorically needy limits may nonetheless not 
have enough resources to cover their medical expenses.  Under the medically needy provisions, 
Medicaid pays part of these expenses, thus preventing destitution.  The implementation of 
medically needy coverage, however, varies greatly across states and types of medical care.  The 
types of care covered under these arrangements include institutional (long–term) care, home and 
community based service (HCBS) care.   15 
 
As pointed out above, the term “medically needy” has both a loose and a strict definition.  
The loose definition we use refers to all programs for receiving Medicaid due to catastrophic 
medical expenses.  However, in formal Medicaid language, the term “Medically Needy” refers to 
just one of several mechanisms for coping with unaffordable medical expenses.  As a rule we 
will use the lower-case term “medically needy” to refer to the loose definition, and the upper 
case term “Medically Needy” to refer to the formal program. 
 
Figure 3 presents a diagram of how individuals may qualify for medically needy coverage under 
the various provisions.  In addition to having different mechanics, the provisions impose 
different asset and income thresholds.  For example, Medicaid imposes more generous asset 
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The institutionalized medically needy 
 
We begin by looking at provisions for institutional (i.e., nursing home) care.
9  I f  a n  
institutionalized elderly individual’s monthly income is within 300% of the SSI limit, then she 
qualifies for Medicaid (Gruber, 2000) in 39 states plus the District of Columbia through the 
expanded nursing home provision.  Virtually all of the person’s income will still be applied 
towards the cost of care, and the individual will get an allowance.  If an institutionalized person’s 
income is greater than 300% of the SSI limit, but still insufficient to cover her medical expenses, 
she may qualify for Medicaid through one of two mechanisms.  The first is use the formal 
Medically Needy provision, which can be used for any sort of medical expense, to cover 
institutional care.  The individual will have a “spend down” period that lasts until her net income 
– income less medical expenses – falls below the Medically Needy threshold.  After qualifying 
as medically needy, the person still has to direct most of her income to pay for her care.  She can 
keep only a small amount as a personal allowance, while Medicaid uses the rest to keep the 
individual at the institution (Gruber, 2000). 
The second mechanism for receiving institutional care is to use a Qualified Income or 
Miller Trust.   Income deposited in these trusts is excluded from the Medicaid tests.  The 
individual deposits enough income in a trust to fall below the 300% limit and qualify for 
expanded nursing home coverage.  Once the individual passes away, the state receives any 
money remaining in the trust, up to the amount that Medicaid has paid on the individual’s 
behalf.
10  (Weschler, 2005.)   
Of the 39 states offering enhanced nursing home coverage, 25 also offer Medically Needy 
coverage.  The remaining 15 states are required by Federal law to allow applicants to use Miller 
Trusts.  Four of the states that provide medically needy coverage permit Miller Trusts as well  
(Stone, 2002.) 
Of the 11 states not offering expanded nursing home coverage, 9 offer Medically Needy 
coverage.  The difference between these states and the states offering expanded nursing home 
                                                            
9 The remainder of this section utilizes overviews by Stone (2002), Walker and Accius (2010), and The Kaiser 
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (2010). 
10 Prior to the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act in 1993, it was acceptable to place extra income in 
a self-created discretionary fund to acquire Medicaid coverage.  Since 1993, apart from limited trusts such as the 
Miller or Qualified Income Trusts, most discretionary trust funds are treated as countable income or assets and may 
restrict people from obtaining Medicaid.  (See Goldfarb, 2005.) 18 
 
nursing home is that individuals in these states are not automatically eligible for Medicaid 
nursing home care if their income is below 300% of the SSI level.  However, given that most 
individuals in nursing homes incur medical expenses far greater than 300% of the SSI level, 
there is little practical difference in Medicaid eligibility across the different states.  All 
individuals with incomes below 300% of the SSI level in either type of state will deplete all their 
resources and will be eligible for Medicaid nursing home care through the Medically Needy 
program.  The remaining two states, Indiana and Missouri, lack both provisions.  However, 
Indiana and Missouri are both 209(b) states.  To reduce the hardships that SSI beneficiaries may 
face in 209(b) states, Federal rules require these states to allow individuals to spend down to the 
states’ income and asset limits for Medicaid.
11  The rules thus mandate that 209(b) states offer 
the equivalent of a Medically Needy program, even if the states do not formally offer the 
Medically Needy option (Smith et al., 2000).  Four 209(b) states – Indiana, Missouri, Ohio and 
Oklahoma – offer a spend-down provision in accordance with this mandate.  With this provision 
in place, institutionalized individuals in every state have at least one way to qualify for Medicaid 
if they are destitute and institutionalized. 
Table 6 shows the provisions offered in each state, and the associated income and asset 
limits.  In most states, the Medically Needy income limits (income less medical expenses) are 
stricter than the income limits for the categorically needy.
12   
 
                                                            
11 The mandate is in the 2000 House Bill 1111, Section 11.445, which specifies that an individual eligible for or 
receiving nursing home care must be given the opportunity to have those Medicaid dollars follow them to the 
community and to choose the personal care option in the community that best meets their needs (Neisz, 2002). 
12This raises the possibility of a discontinuity in coverage.  An individual whose income is $1 above the categorically 
needy limit may need to spend a considerable amount to qualify under the Medically Needy provision.  However, in 
practice the discontinuity in coverage is unimportant in most cases because institutionalized Medicaid recipients 
must spend almost all of their income on their care.  The median cost of nursing home care, $5,550 per month in 
2010 Whether an individual’s income is slightly more or less than 300% of the SSI limit ($6743 = $2,022), 






































Alabama   No  NA  NA  Yes  NA  500,000  Yes 
Alaska   No  NA  NA  Yes
2   NA  500,000  Yes 
Arizona   Yes  50,003  360  Yes  76.65  500,000  Yes 
Arkansas   Yes  2,000  108  Yes  40  500,000  Yes 
California   Yes  2,000  600  No  35  750,000  No 
Colorado   No  NA  NA  Yes  NA  500,000  Yes 
Delaware   No  NA  NA  Yes
4   NA  500,000  Yes 
District of Columbia   Yes  4,000  577  No  70  750,000  No 
Florida   Yes  5,000  180  Yes  35  500,000  Yes 
Georgia   Yes  2,000  317  Yes  30  500,000  No 
Idaho   No  NA  NA  Yes  NA  750,000  Yes 
Iowa   Yes  10,000  483  Yes  30  500,000  Yes 
Kansas   Yes  2,000  495  Yes  30  500,000  No 
Kentucky   Yes  2,000  217  Yes  40  500,000  No 
Louisiana   Yes  2,000 
Urban:  100;  
Rural:  92  Yes  38  500,000  No 
Maine   Yes  2,000  903  Yes  40  750,000  No 
Maryland   Yes  2,500  350  Yes  40  500,000  No 











6:  408  Yes  60  500,000  No 
Mississippi   No  NA  NA  Yes  NA  500,000  Yes 
Montana   Yes  2,000  625  Yes  40  500,000  No 




Nevada   No  NA  NA  Yes  NA  500,000  Yes 
New Jersey   Yes  4,000  367  Yes  40  750,000  No 
New Mexico   No  NA  NA  Yes  NA  750,000  Yes 
New York   Yes  2,000  767  No  50  750,000  No 
North Carolina   Yes  2,000  242  No  30  500,000  No 
Oregon   No  NA  NA  Yes  NA  500,000  Yes 
Pennsylvania   Yes  2,400  425  Yes  30  500,000  No 
Rhode Island   Yes  4,000  800  Yes  50  500,000  No 
South Carolina   No  NA  NA  Yes  NA  500,000  Yes 
South Dakota   No  NA  NA  Yes  NA  500,000  Yes 
Tennessee   Yes  2,000  241  Yes  30  500,000  No 
Texas   No  NA  NA  Yes  NA  500,000  Yes 
Utah   Yes  2,000  370  Yes  45  500,000  No 
Vermont   Yes  2,000 
916 (991 for 
Chittenden)  Yes  47.66  500,000  No 
Washington   Yes  2,000  674  Yes  41.62  500,000  No 
West Virginia   Yes  2,000  200  Yes  NA  500,000  No 
Wisconsin   Yes  2,000  592  Yes  45  750,000  No 






and C:  476  Yes  54  750,000  No 21 
 
  
Medicaid’s ability to recover assets from the estate 
 
The asset limits presented in Table 6 are similar to the asset limits for the categorically needy 
presented in Table 4.  There are two key distinctions between the two sets of asset tests, both 
relating to their treatment of housing.  First, the Medicaid asset test for the categorically needy 
excludes the individual’s principal residence, whereas the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
stipulates that the Medicaid asset test for the medically needy places limits on the amount of 
home equity that is excluded.  Although there are limits on the amount of home equity that can 
be excluded, the second to last column of Table 6 shows the limits are quite generous.
13  Second, 
and more importantly, houses owned by institutionalized individuals who do not plan to return to 
                                                            
13 If a spouse or dependent resides in the house, the equity limits do not apply.  (ElderLaw, 2011.) 
Hawaii   Yes  2,000  469  No  30  750,000  No 
Illinois   Yes  2,000  903  No  30  NA  No 
Indiana   No
6  NA  NA  No  NA  500,000  No 
Minnesota
   Yes  3,000  677  No  69  500,000  No 
Missouri   No
6  NA  NA  No  NA  500,000  No 
New Hampshire   Yes  2,500  591  Yes  50  500,000  No 
North Dakota   Yes  3,000  750  No  40  500,000  No 
Ohio   No
6  NA  NA  Yes  NA  500,000  Yes 
Oklahoma   No


















that house no longer serve as principal residences.
14  Therefore, the home equity of that 
individual is not longer excluded from the asset test.  More precisely, the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (2005b, page 2) states that an individual’s house is included in the 
asset test when he “has no living spouse or dependents and:  moves into a nursing home or other 
medical institution on a permanent basis without the intent to return; transfers the home for less 
than fair market value, or; dies.”  An essential part of the definition is “the intent to return” 
provision, designed to exempt individuals whose stay at the institution is temporary.  In most 
states, the intent to return is based on the beliefs of the institutionalized individual, with no 
reference to the individual’s underlying medical condition.  Only the 209(b) states are allowed to 
use more objective criteria, such as a professional medical diagnosis or the duration of stay, to 
assess the likelihood that the individual might return to his home.  A mechanism that is available 
to non-209(b) states is to restrict the institutionalized individual’s income allowance so much 
that the individual can no longer cover property taxes and maintenance costs, forcing her to sell 
her home.  However, individuals may be able to resist such “squeezes” by using reverse 
mortgages to fund taxes and maintenance.  (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
2005b.) 
  Once an individual dies his home ceases to be protected.  The Omnibus Reconciliation Act 
of 1993 requires states to seek from beneficiary estates reimbursement for long-term care, both 
in-house and institutional, and services provided concurrently with long-term care.  However, 
states cannot pursue homes occupied by the beneficiary’s spouse or dependents (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2005a).  Furthermore, because the state may be one 
of many claimants to the estate, and given the general complexity of estate law – which in a few 
states explicitly protects estates from Medicaid claims – Medicaid collects relatively little money 
from estates.
15  In 2004, estate recoveries equaled 0.8% of Medicaid spending on nursing homes, 
with the most successful state, Oregon, recovering 5.8% of its nursing home expenditures.  (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2005d.)  Table 7 provides information on asset 
recovery practices and outcomes.  
                                                            
14 The inclusion of housing in the asset tests for institutionalized individuals applies to the categorically needy as 
well as the medically needy.  Most categorically needy individuals, however, do not hold significant housing equity.  
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2005b). 
15 States do not have to pursue an estate if they judge pursuit to not be cost-effective.  The definition of “cost-














































































  One device states use to enhance their recovery prospects is to place liens on their 
beneficiaries’ assets.  The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TERFA) of 1982 allows 
states to place liens on the homes of permanently institutionalized Medicaid beneficiaries.  After 25 
 
the beneficiary dies, states may also place “post-death” liens on her estate.  (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2005c.)   
TERFA liens can help states protect themselves from abuses of the “intent to return” 
provision.  While the “intent to return” is generally based on the subjective opinion of the 
beneficiary himself, TERFA liens may be established on the basis of objective criteria.  (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2005c.)  Table 8 summarizes the criteria states use.   
TERFA liens also protect states if a beneficiary attempts to transfer the house to a third 
party (e.g., a child) prior to applying for Medicaid.  The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 extended 
Medicaid’s “look-back” period from the three years preceding application to five years.   
Transfers made during the look-back period are subject to Medicaid review.  If the applicant is 
found to have made a net transfer, i.e., sold some of his assets at prices below their fair market 
value, his eligibility will be delayed.  (ElderLaw, 2011.)  
  The degree to which elderly individuals transfer their assets in order to become eligible for 
Medicaid has been the subject of several studies.  These studies find that the elderly transfer little 
if any of their money to their heirs for the purpose of making themselves eligible for Medicaid.  
Thus extending the “look back” period past five years or more aggressive pursuit of transferred 
assets is unlikely to defray much of Medicaid’s expenses.  Norton (1995) argues that elderly 
individuals are more likely to receive transfers in an attempt to avoid Medicaid.  In contrast, 
Bassett (2007) finds that “the self-assessed probability of entering a nursing home is a significant 
determinant of making an asset transfer.”  Bassett estimates that in 1993 there were about 
$1  billion “Medicaid-induced” asset transfers, equaling about 3 percent of total Medicaid 
expenditures.  Many of the people making the transfers, however, did not receive Medicaid long-
term care benefits, implying a smaller final cost to Medicaid.  Waidmann and Liu (2006) study 
asset transfers over the period 1995-2004.  They conclude that “even the most aggressive pursuit 
of transferred assets would recover only about 1% of total Medicaid spending for long-term 
care.”  Reviewing the literature, O’Brien (2005) concludes that the evidence “do[es] not support 
the claim that asset transfers are widespread or costly to Medicaid.”  In summary, the evidence is 
mixed whether the elderly give or receive transfers to affect the Medicaid eligibility.  However, 






















Alabama  Yes  3  Yes  Yes  No   No 
Arkansas  Yes   4  Yes  Yes  No  No 
California  Yes   No  No  No  No  No  
Connecticut  Yes   6  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Delaware  Yes  24  Yes  No  No  No  
Hawaii  Yes  6  Yes  Yes  No   No 
Idaho  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No  
Illinois  Yes  4  Yes  No  No   No 
Indiana  NR  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Maryland  Yes  NR  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Massachusetts  Yes  6  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  
Minnesota  Yes  6  Yes  No  No   No 
Montana  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  Yes 
New Hampshire  Yes  No  No  No  No  Yes 
New York  Yes  No  No  No  No  No  
Oklahoma  Yes  6  Yes  Yes  No  No  
South Dakota  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  Yes 
West Virginia  NR  NR  Yes  No  No  Yes 






The non-institutionalized medically needy 
The structure of Medicaid coverage for non-institutionalized medically needy individuals 
is similar to that for those in institutions.  Individuals with specific needs such as home health 
care can qualify under provisions tailored to those needs.  Individuals not qualifying under these 
limited provisions can qualify under the general medically needy provision, if their state offers it.   27 
 
Individuals needing long-term care can often substitute home-based care for care at a 
nursing home or another institution.  To promote the use of home-based care, states can utilize 
1915(c) Home and Community Based Service Care (HCBS) waivers, which give them additional 
flexibility in how they provide these services (Smith et al., 2000).   Services that can be offered 
under an HCBS waiver range from traditional medical services such as dental care and skilled 
nursing services to non-medical services such as case management and environment 
modification.   
In most states, the income test used for 1915(c) waivers is the same as the one used for 
expanded nursing home coverage, namely 300% of the SSI limit.  Other states (e.g., California) 
impose more stringent tests.  23 states (including Arizona) allow the use of Miller Trusts.  As 
with the expanded nursing home program, beneficiaries are expected to direct their income 
toward the cost of their expenses.  The income allowances, however, can be and vary greatly 
across states.  (Walker and Accius, 2010.)  
The asset limits for 1915(c) applicants are the ones for the categorically needy.  (Stone, 
2002.)  Housing is excluded from the asset test, but the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 
requires states to pursue estates for the cost of long-term care.  On the other hand, states do not 
have to pursue costs when they judge declares it not to be cost-effective.  (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2005a.)  Given the limited success of estate recovery in general, it 
is unlikely to play a large role in the case at hand. 
Some states limit access by requiring 1915(c) beneficiaries to exhibit difficulties in 
performing at least three Activities of Daily Living; functional eligibility for nursing homes 
requires only two.  Most states impose limits on how much they spend per year for Home and 
Community Based Service Care.  Furthermore, states are free to choose how many applications 
to approve.  They are also free to limit the number of waivers.
16  Many states have more 
individuals in need of waivers than open “slots”, and thus operate waiting lists.  (The Kaiser 
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2009).  Table 9 summarizes the 1915(c) HCBS 
waiver programs offered by each state.  
                                                            
16 For example, New Hampshire and Michigan limit 1915(c) waivers for the aged to those who are also 
disabled.  Only two states, Arizona and Vermont do not offer HCBS waivers, and Arizona offers a similar program.  
(Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2011).  
 28 
 
In addition to utilizing 1915(c) waivers, states can provide HBCS services under two other 
provisions:  the federally-mandated home health benefit provided by all states; and the optional 
personal care benefit, which in 2006 was provided by 31 states.  In 2006, the two programs 
incurred 34% of total HCBS expenditures and assisted 61% of the HCBS beneficiaries.  Most 
states screened applicants to these programs with the income and asset tests for categorically 
needy recipients.  There is variation in the financial eligibility limits states require to get this 
benefit.  Some states keep it at the 300% level, but others restrict further.  Many states also 
provide a medically needy spend-down option.  (The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the 
































Alabama       300%, MT  7,094  YES, YES  UL  
Alaska  300%, MT  0       NO, YES  1,656 
Arizona  NP
4         
Arkansas  300%, MT  0       NO, YES  UL 
California       100%  1,200  NO, YES  2,022 
Colorado       300%, MT  0  NO, NO  2,022 
Delaware  100%, MT  0  250%, MT  0  YES, NO  1,685 
District of 
Columbia 
     300%  0  NO, YES  2,022 
Florida  300%, MT  0  300%, MT  12,684  YES, YES  674 
Georgia       300%, MT  763  YES, NO  674 
Idaho       300%, MT  0  NO, NO  674
5 
Iowa  300%, MT  0       NO, YES  2,022 
Kansas  300%  0       YES, YES  727 
Kentucky       300%, MT  0  NO, YES  694 
Louisiana       300%  8,433  NO, YES  2,022 
Maine       300%  0  NO, YES  1,128 
Maryland  300%  6,000       NO, YES  2,022 































Michigan       300%  3,404  NO, NO  2,022 
Mississippi       300%, MT  6,000  YES, YES  UL 
Montana       100%  600  NO, YES  625 
Nebraska       100%  0  NO, YES  903 
Nevada  300%, MT  343  300%, MT  0  NO, NO  UL 
New Jersey       300%  0  NO, YES  2,022 
New Mexico       300%  5,000  NO, NO  UL 
New York       300%, MT  0  YES, YES  787 
North Carolina      100%  6,000  NO, YES  903 
Oregon       300%, MT  0  NO, YES  1,822 
Pennsylvania  300%  0    NO, YES  2,022 
Rhode Island  300%  0  300%  99  NO, NO  923 
South Carolina       300%, MT  2,016  NO, YES  2,022 
South Dakota  300%, MT  0    NO, YES  694 
Tennessee     300%, MT  350  NO, YES  1,348 
Texas     300%, MT  40,107  YES, YES  2,022 




Vermont  NP            
Washington       300%  0  NO, YES   2,022 
West Virginia       300%  0  NO, YES  674 
Wisconsin       300%  13,296  NO, NO   2,022 
Wyoming       300%, MT  210  NO, YES  UL 
209(b) States 
Connecticut       300%  0  NO, YES  1,805 
Hawaii       100%  100  NO, NO  1,128 
Illinois  100%  0  100%  0  NO, NO  674 
Indiana       100%, MT  1,279  NO, YES  2,022 
Minnesota  300%  0       NO, YES  935 
Missouri       100%  0  NO, YES  1,113 































North Dakota      100%  0  NO, NO  750 
Ohio       300%, MT  1,224  NO, YES  1,314 
Oklahoma       300%, MT  0  NO, YES  1,011 














The non-institutionalized medically needy:other pathways 
 
For individuals unable to qualify under any of the preceding pathways, the Medically 
Needy provision provides an important “last chance” opportunity to qualify for Medicaid 
(Crowley, 2003). The income and asset levels for the non-institutionalized Medically Needy 
applicants are the same as ones for institutionalized individuals presented in Table 6.  Similarly, 
non-institutionalized individuals with high incomes end up paying most if not all of their medical 
expenses before they receive aid. 
  Because the income limits for the Medically Needy provision are usually stricter than the 
limits for the “income needy” (e.g., the Categorically Needy, Dual Eligibles, and certain HCBS 
beneficiaries) non-institutionalized individuals also face a possible discontinuity in coverage.  In 
consequence, the penalty to being Medically Needy rather than income-needy may be 
significant. 31 
 
  By way of example, consider two individuals in Pennsylvania.  Both individuals require 
health care costing $500 per month.  The first individual has a monthly income of $900 month, 
which in Pennsylvania allows him to qualify as categorically needy (Table 4).  This person pays 
nothing for medical care.  The second individual has a monthly income of $1,100, who does not 
qualify as categorically needy.  Deducting medical expenses leaves her with a net income of 
$600, which is above Pennsylvania’s Medically Needy net income limit (Table 6).  In short, 
receiving an additional $200 of income costs the second person $500 of Medicaid benefits.  The 
quantitative importance of these discontinuities is of course an empirical matter, depending both 
on the formal provisions and their practical application by Medicaid administrators.    
 
Discussion 
  In a number of recent studies, the joint effect of Medicaid and public assistance programs 
such as SSI is modeled as a consumption floor:  if an individual is not able to cover her medical 
expenses and purchase a minimal amount of consumption, the government will cover the 
difference (Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1995; Palumbo, 1999; De Nardi, French and Jones, 
2010; French and Jones, 2011).  Is this a reasonable approximation of the Medicaid system? 
  Our review suggests that the effective consumption floor provided by Medicaid varies 
greatly by income and asset levels, and medical conditions.  Individuals in nursing homes are 
given much smaller allowances, and are more likely to forfeit the value of their house, than non-
institutionalized individuals.  This distinction has been recognized by Brown and Finklestein 
(2008), among others.  The extent to which institutionalized individuals must surrender their 
homes depends on a number of factors, including the interpretation of the “intent to return”, the 
willingness of the state to impose liens, and the effectiveness of estate recovery, all of which 
vary across states. 
  We also find the potential for discontinuities in coverage.  Medicaid recipients can be 
placed in two groups.  The first is the “income needy,” who receive benefits because they have 
low income.  Income needy individuals include those receiving expanded nursing home 
coverage, many recipients of HCBS services, and Dual Eligibles, as well as the categorically 
needy.  The second group is the “expenditure needy” who receive benefits because their medical 
expenses are large relative to their income.  This group includes individuals utilizing Miller 
Trusts, as well as the Medically Needy.  In some cases, the net income (income less medical 32 
 
expenses) limits for the medically needy are stricter than the income limits for the income needy.  
This raises the possibility that the income needy receive more generous coverage.  We believe 
that the scope for such unequal treatment is greatest for non-institutionalized individuals. 
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